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ABSTRACT
In this paper we evaluate how harmonization of patent laws in China and India to developed
world standards has affected innovative research and development activity in the life sciences industry
of those countries. The patents listed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office were used as a
proxy to measure innovative activity. The number and types of patents filed over the period from 1976
through 2008 were analyzed for trends towards innovation. At a high level, we found that 'Drugs and
Medical' account for only 6% of Chinese patents but make up 20% of the universe of Indian patents.
When evaluating patent activity over time, we found that filings rose exponentially in the mid-nineties
corresponding to the creation and implementation of product patent laws in both countries. India
exhibited a much higher and steeper increase, likely due to its previously established capabilities as a
generics manufacturer. When segmenting the data based on type of firms (academic, foreign
multinationals and local private) we found that post product patent laws, local private firms exhibit
more activity in India whereas local firms and multinationals show similar amounts of activity in China.
In both countries, academic institutions show the greatest amount of activity compared to the
multinationals and local private companies. We conclude that stronger IP laws have resulted in greater
innovative activity as seen in the exponential rise in patent filings in the life sciences industry in both
China and India. Although India has shown greater activity compared to China possibly due to its
established capabilities in the generics space as a result of its protective patent regime prior to the
harmonization.
Thesis Advisor: Fiona Murray PhD.
Title: Associate Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management
Thesis Advisor: Martha L. Gray, PhD.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
Nearly every major pharma, biotech and medical device company is looking to the emerging
markets as the next opportunity for growth. The traditional markets of US, Europe and Japan have
saturated and the real growth is seen in the exploding middle classes of the emerging countries (Hill,
2009). This trend is evident by the number of companies that have expansion in these nations as a part
of their strategy (Jarvis, 2010). More interesting is the number of companies that have set up research
and development centers in these countries (Hanson, 2010). In general, investment in R&D by MNCs
around the world has been steadily increasing with a large proportion of it going into India and China. In
2006, the world's top 1,250 firms invested US$510B in R&D in India and China (Parayil, 2008, Chapter 5,
pg 289). It is clear that the MNCs are looking at emerging nations not only as markets where they can
sell their drugs to a burgeoning middle class, but also as places with raw talent that can help them
discover the next blockbuster drug or device to add to their bottom line.
This shift of moving innovative research and development activities to China and India has been
precipitated by many factors such as a large supply of low-cost skilled professionals, compliance with
World Trade Organization (WTO)'s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) and the expanding numbers of middle class consumers (Parayil, 2008, Chapter 5). Of these, the
TRIPS treaty has been particularly noteworthy. The treaty is an agreement that binds all members of the
WTO to high IP standards. It outlines minimum standards for protecting and enforcing intellectual
property rights including monopoly grants of limited duration, enforcement provisions and methods for
IP dispute settlements. India signed off on the agreement in 1995 and was given 10 years to bring its
laws into compliance. China signed off in December 2001.
This harmonization of IP laws to developed world standards has been political and controversial
and there are differences in opinion as to whether it is beneficial to the poorer, developing countries or
not. Because patents eliminate generic competition during their terms leading to higher drug prices and
reduced patient access, the policy hurts developing countries. On the other hand it is argued that
patents create incentives for developing drugs for conditions that are endemic to those countries. In
this scenario, patents may be tolerable despite the short term costs such as limited access to affordable
medicines.
In this paper I will evaluate how the strengthening of IP laws in China and India has affected the
level of innovative research and development in the life sciences industry of those countries. Stronger
IP laws could lead to one of three scenarios:
e status quo -TRIPS leads to no changes in research and development activity,
* Expanded local R&D by MNCs: pharmaceutical multinationals (MNCs) benefit by buying
up local companies and establishing their presence to take advantage of the new
markets for existing drugs
e New and expanded R&D by local companies: local companies start to develop
themselves as global research and development powerhouses
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A comparative study of the impact of stronger patent laws on Chinese and Indian life sciences
industry could lead to some useful insights. While a lot has been written about effect of stronger IP laws
on the pharmaceutical industry of India, the China story remains unclear. We have chosen to study
China and India together because both these countries are emerging nations (The New Champions,
2008) and both have recently harmonized their IP laws to developed world standards. Therefore, they
are good comparative cases to evaluate whether strong IP laws have a positive correlation to innovation
led economic growth.
We have used the patents database from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as
a proxy to measure innovative activity. The USPTO database is rich in information and nicely organized
allowing us to do multi-level analysis. The number and type of patents filed over the period from 1976
through 2008 were analyzed giving us more than 30 years of data to look for trends towards innovation.
The results indicate that innovative activity has exponentially increased in both countries since
harmonization of patent laws. The magnitude of the increase is different and likely based on the
development level of the industry in each country and on the details of the policies implemented by
each country.
The next section contains a background on innovation and the effect of intellectual property (IP)
on innovative activity. The section also includes a thorough literature review on the impact of strong IP
laws on developing countries. Chapter 3 covers the research setting with a brief introduction to the
history of intellectual property in the world with further detail on the evolution of IP laws in China and
India to their current forms. The nature of the life sciences industry in these two countries is also
discussed. Chapter 4 contains the empirical design and methods of data analysis. Chapter 5 lays out the
results and discussion. The paper ends with Conclusion and Next Steps in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2 INNOVATION & PATENTS
According to Merriam Webster, innovation is defined as the introduction of something new - a
new idea, method or device. It is derived from the Latin terms novus for new and innovatio for
something newly created. Practically speaking, innovation refers to the economic realization of new
ideas or knowledge in terms of products, processes or services (Beroggi, 2006).
Continuous innovation is necessary for the prosperity of individuals, companies and nations.
Since ancient times, societies that have been able to continuously innovate are the ones that survive
and thrive. Egyptians invented the pyramid, beer and learned anatomy but were overrun by the Greeks.
The Greeks supported philosophical inquiry, art and drama as part of their economic and military
success, but were conquered by the Romans. The Roman Empire expanded its territory with roads and
other innovative infrastructure. The Ancient Chinese developed compasses and gunpowder. During
ancient times, technical and cultural leadership passed from Africa (Egypt) to Europe (Greece and Rome)
and then during the middle ages to Islamic societies and China. Europe dominated during the
Renaissance and the US after that. Today, globalization has overcome geographic limitations. As Tom
Friedman notes in his book 'The World is Flat', the playing field is now much more even for countries
such as China and India and the key to dominance lies in the ability to innovate. Nations that are able to
promote, reward and capture innovation will be the ones that are successful and prosperous (Gollin,
2008, pg 12).
Innovation is a complex process. Many factors drive innovation such as technical know-how,
intellectual property laws, government support, university collaborations, risk-taking behavior, and
availability of investment capital. Of these, intellectual property (IP) was specifically created as a key
driving force for stimulating innovation. IP includes patents, copyrights, trade secrets and trademarks.
When a patent is awarded to the creator of a product, it excludes others from making, using, selling or
importing the product for a pre-specified period of time (Chaudhuri, 2005, p 4). As a result, the creator
is able to exercise monopoly over the product, charge high prices and reap the benefits of his/her
innovation. IP affects innovation by creating an incentive to invent. Additionally, by forcing disclosure it
provides a mechanism to enable dissemination of the knowledge so that the innovation can move
forward. In this way it captures, channels and shapes innovation (Gollin, 2008).
The pharmaceutical industry in particular is dependent upon IP protection for innovation
because it costs a lot more to research and develop drugs than to manufacture and sell them. In order
to prevent others from imitating his/her invention, an inventor who spends his time and money into
discovering a therapy needs patent protection for a certain period of time for market exclusivity in order
to recoup his/her R&D costs and enjoy profits. An empirical study by Taylor and Silberston (1973) for
the UK industry showed that in the absence of patent protection, investment in pharmaceutical R&D
would be significantly reduced (Chaudhuri, 2005).
Traditionally, each nation has been free to develop its own policies to dictate intellectual
property protection. However, recently globalization has catapulted intellectual property to center
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stage. As more and more companies go global, even subtle differences in IP laws between nations have
a big impact on the companies and subsequently on the larger economy.
In his prize winning book, Kicking Away the Ladder, Ha Joon Chang contends that IP protection,
among other policies, are imposed upon the less developed world by the developed world in the name
of 'good' policies however, when in fact these make it even more difficult for the developing countries
to reach their economic goals. According to him, the developed countries did not get to their current
level through the policies and institutions that they recommend to developing countries today. In fact,
when these countries were still in the developing stage, their patent laws were very lax. For example, in
the USA before 1836, patents were granted without any proof of originality. This led to patenting of
imported technologies and encouraged racketeers to patent devices already in use and then demand
money under threat of suit for infringement. Moreover, few countries allowed patents on chemical and
pharmaceutical substances (only processes). As a result the patent laws offered very little protection.
Moreover, in most countries, including Britain (before 1852), the Netherlands, Austria and France,
patenting by their nationals of imported inventions was often explicitly allowed. There were
widespread and serious violations of IPR by even the most advanced developed country until the late
nineteenth century and beyond. Therefore, Chang concludes that the developed world should not
impose policies such as IPR on the developing countries and these countries should be allowed to adopt
policies and institutions that are suitable to their stages of development.
In his book, The Development Dilemma, Robert Ostergard concludes that developed and
developing countries purse different IPR polices based on their individual economic and political
agendas. A developed country typically has established high technology industries, therefore a strong
IPR regime is important for it to sustain its position in global markets. On the other hand, developing
countries have low levels of technological development and no incentive to protect IPR. He uses case
studies of South Africa and China to demonstrate the effect of IPR on developing countries with
different circumstances. For China lax IPR protection was a means to support economic growth,
whereas for South Africa a weak IPR regime was a means to protect its population against a deadly HIV
epidemic. He concludes that the overall benefits for a developing country adopting a strong IPR regime
are in marginal or even negative. Ultimately many ethical and moral dilemmas are created when the
goals of developing and developed countries collide. Therefore the solution to the IPR issue is not a
simple one and each country needs to be able to determine what policies are appropriate based on its
own circumstance.
In his book, The WTO and India's Pharmaceuticals Industry, Sudip Chaudhuri also argues that the
positive impact of TRIPS of stimulating research for innovation is questionable. The difference in
research capabilities between the pharmaceutical industries of the developed and developing countries
is so vast that patent protection only benefits the MNCs of the developed world. For the developing
countries, the drug prices become high, limiting patient access and the diseases endemic to the
developing world are not targeted for drug development. As a result, even though the local Indian
companies may be successful in reaping financial returns, such gains are incomparably small compared
to the cost of high drug prices. In addition, like Chang, Chaudhuri shows that most developed countries
adopted pharmaceutical product patent protection after reaching a high degree of economic
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development. Therefore he claims that it is morally and historically unfair to deny the developing
countries the privileges that the developed world enjoyed at the corresponding stage of its
development.
In their paper, "Strong Medicine: Patent Reform and the Emergence of a Research-Driven
Pharamceutical Industry in India", Arora, Banerjee and Chaterjee looked at the impact of TRIPS and
patent protection on the R&D returns of 315 publicly traded pharmaceutical firms in India. They found a
positive correlation between patent reform and increase in R&D investment. They also measured
private returns to R&D by using stock market valuations and found an increase in returns that
corresponded with the strengthening of stronger patent laws -although this effect was found to be
mostly concentrated in the most technologically progressive firms. They concluded that as a result of
stronger patent laws, Indian pharmaceutical companies are increasing their research and development
efforts and are seeing a net positive return on this investment.
Kyle and McGahan also looked into the relationship between patent protection and investment
in new drug development. They found that patent protection is associated with an increase in research
and development (R&D) effort, but only for diseases endemic to high income countries. The market
potential of neglected diseases of the developing world is not high enough to promote research and
development despite strong patent laws. They defined research and development effort by the number
of new clinical trials initiated per year for a specific disease. To evaluate the potential market size for
each disease, they used the number of people dying from a disease by country and year. They found
that global patent protection is associated with increase in R&D effort of diseases associated with
populations of high income countries. For less wealthy countries, R&D effort does not increase with
increased patent protection.
Most of the research regarding the effect of stronger patent laws has forewarned negative
effects on developing countries. In contrast, Arora's paper evaluated the Indian life sciences market and
found a positive correlation between stronger patent laws and economic returns to domestic firms. We
wanted to further evaluate the impact of stronger patent protection on innovative activity of developing
nations using solid data analysis. The number of patents filed and granted is a good indicator to assess
the level of inventive activity of a nation. Hence, via analysis of patent applications from both China and
India we hoped to get insights into trends in innovative activity in developing nations after they
harmonize their patent laws to developed world standards. In her paper, "The Impact of Higher
Standards in Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Industries under the TRIPS Agreement - A
comparative study of China and India', Xuan Li conducted a similar analysis and studied the static effects
on drug availability and prices as well as dynamic effects on amount of R&D investment and patent
filing in both countries. She concluded that China has been suffering both static and dynamic losses
compared to India. However, the specifics of the inventive activity remain unclear. This paper hopes to
shed light on this issue by conducting a thorough data analysis of US patents filings.
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Chapter 3 RESEARCH SETTING
A brief history of Intellectual Property Laws:
Intellectual property protection has roots in early civilization. In medieval times, 500-1000 years
ago craft guilds kept tight control over the transmission of knowledge within the apprentice system. The
roots of intellectual property can be found in this practice of trade secrets as a way of maintaining
advantage over others. The first formal intellectual property law, the Venetian patent decree, was
passed in 1474. According to the law, anyone who disclosed a new 'ingenious device' was given the
exclusive right to use the device. Others were forbidden from copying the device unless they licensed it
from the inventor. As a result of this law, hundreds of patents were granted. During the Renaissance,
use of copyright and patent laws spread throughout Europe. In 1623, the English Court passed the
'Statue of Monopolies' that allowed the King to issue 'patent letters' to original inventions, but only for a
fixed number of fourteen years. During the reign of Queen Anne (1702-1714), an additional
requirement for a written description of the invention was added. The Industrial Revolution led to
continuous expansion of such laws and these became the foundation of the patent laws that were
enacted in the US, New Zealand and Australia. In the US, the first patent Act was passed in 1790. In
Australia, the system of granting patents was passed in 1624. The modern French patent law was
created during the French Revolution in 1790. The UK Patents Act which harmonized the UK patent law
with the European Patent Convention was passed in 1977. In Japan, the Patent Monopoly Act was
established in 1885 (Gollin, 2008)
Figure 1: Timeline of creation of patent laws of select developed countries
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Development of IPR protection in emerging market economies
Intellectual property laws are not as readily adopted in developing countries because their
governments have to find a balance between industry protection and public health. Due to the pressure
to give industries inexpensive access to technology and consumers inexpensive access to drugs, the
governments of these countries typically resist imposing strict IPR protection. Copying successful
innovations from elsewhere tends to be the least expensive way to meet this goal. Therefore the
incentive for developing nations to impose a strong IPR regime does not exist.
Intellectual property law history and Pharmaceutical Industry in China:
China had no history of IPR protection. Chinese cultural legacy did not recognize private
property rights. The Chinese considered past knowledge important public heritage and coupled with the
need of elders to teach juniors through control and discipline, these cultural elements demanded the
wide availability of intellectual information. When the intellectual property laws were developing in the
West (mainly during the industrial revolution), there was no similar counterpart movement in China.
Starting in the early 1900s when China's economic growth attracted foreign investments, foreign
merchants started pressing for stronger IP rights in the country. A number of treaties were signed,
including the Mackay Treaty of 1902, however they failed to be properly implemented. In 1904, the
government enacted trademark protection and in 1910 the Da Quing copyright law, however, China's
attempt to relegate foreign trademark and copyright holders to a secondary status led to the law's
collapse. Attempts to revise these laws in 1923 and 1931 failed. In 1932, the government again
enacted new patent laws however, their implementation failed due to lack of legal experience and
knowledge. Following the Communist rule in 1949, two laws were passed according to which inventors
received certifications of authorship and a monetary reward instead of the limited monopoly privilege.
This system provided minimal incentives for innovation and hence produced little success. In the early
1960s, China underwent the Cultural Revolution and all patent laws were once again overhauled. The
new regulation claimed that all inventions were the property of the state and no person could claim
monopoly over them. The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 brought about a change in the IPR
policy under the new leader, Deng Xiaoping. This time, the incentive to improve IPR was internally
driven. Deng concluded that inventors needed incentives to innovate. China became part of the World
Intellectual Property Rights Organization in 1980 and also established the Patent Bureau that year. In
1984, after extensive research of patent laws of other countries, China established their own Patent law.
However, at that time the patent law excluded chemicals and pharmaceuticals, food, beverages and
condiments as well as computer software. Pharmaceuticals were added to the law in 1992.
China implemented intellectual property rights (IPR) policy much earlier than TRIPS would have
required it. Nevertheless, intellectual property rights in China are a recent phenomenon. Because
pharmaceutical product patents were added to the law in 1992, we will take 1992 as the start year of
pharmaceutical product patent protection in China.
Although the China's intellectual property laws are in place, their implementation and
enforcement continues to be unknown and monitored by international and domestic players alike.
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Pfizer's Viagra patent created headlines on this issue. The Viagra patent claims the use of sildenafil
citrate, the active molecule in the drug, for the treatment of male erectile dysfunction. In 2001, 12
domestic Chinese companies came together and filed an invalidation claim against this patent.
Subsequently, the patent reexamination board issued a decision declaring the patent invalid. Pfizer
appealed. In 2006, Beijing's Intermediate People's Court dismissed the invalidation decision and re-
opened the case to evaluate the validity of the patent. An appeal has been filed from the Chinese
companies to reverse this decision. The development of this case is being watched closely by Chinese
and foreign companies alike as a test of China's IPR system (Langer 2007).
Table 1: Summary of patent law history in China
- Chinese cultural legacy does not recognize private property rights
e Several Trademark and Copyright Laws, 1904, 1910, 1928, 1931
* failed due to attempt to relegate foreign trademarks and copyrights to 2"ary status
* Patent law, 1932
* poor execution
* New law under Communist rule provided certificates and monetary compensation to
inventors instead of monopoly privilege, 1949
- Cultural Revolution: all patent laws abolished.
* Current Patent Law, 1984
- Established Patent Bureau, 1980
* Extensive research of over 30 countries and internal experts
* Patent law amended to extend patent protection to drugs, 1992
e Law against unfair competition was enacted, 1993
- Further amendments enacted that harmonized China's patent system to WTO standards, 2000
Pharmaceutical Industry in China
China has a rapidly expanding pharmaceutical industry. China's pharmaceutical industry picked
up growth after the mid-1980s when the government relaxed state-controls and generated competition
among the suppliers. In 2003, there were almost 4,300 pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities in China.
Chinese firms are known for their expertise in manufacturing of bulk drugs and active pharmaceutical
ingredients (APIs). China is the world's second largest producer of pharmaceutical ingredients, and the
largest producer of many products such as penicillin, vitamin C, terramycin, doxycycline hydrochloride
and cephalosporins. It is also promoting innovative research in the area of traditional Chinese
medicines. However, the Chinese pharmaceutical industry is relatively small and highly fragmented
(Parayil G., D'Costa, 2008).
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Pharmaceutical industry and Intellectual property law history in India:
As part of the British colony, India was the beneficiary of the UK patent laws. The Patents and
Design Act of 1911 guaranteed product patenting rights to drug companies. As a result, production and
distribution of medicines in India was almost entirely under the control of MNCs and the prices of
medicines in India were one of the highest in the world. By 1970, MNCs dominated with more than two-
thirds market share in India. However, in 1970, twenty years after independence from the British, the
Indian government passed the Indian Patent Act in which they did away with product patents. Under
the Act, drugs could be patented only for a new method or process of manufacture and not for the
product. The life of a patent was also reduced from about 16 years to five years from the date of sealing
or seven years from the date of filing of complete specifications, whichever was shorter. For patents
other than drugs, the duration was 14 years. As a result, indigenous firms were able to develop reverse
engineering capabilities and innovate new processes of producing existing drugs (generics), thereby
increasing competition to the MNCs. 'This resulted in a substantially declined market share for the
MNCs. In 1970, before the patent law came into effect, MNCs occupied 68% of the Indian
pharmaceutical market. In 1991, this declined to 40%. (Chaudhuri, 2005). Consequently, India
developed a reputation as a producer of low-priced generic drugs. Infact, it is currently the biggest
producer of generics by volume and the leading exporter of medicines to developing countries (Lee,
2008). In 1995 however, the Indian government became a member of the WTO and had to sign the
TRIPS agreement which forced it to update its patent laws to conform to global patent standards by
2005.
India had ten years to come into compliance with TRIPs. Although the treaty was signed in
1995, the laws were put into effect over a period of 10 years through a number of amendments
culminating in the final patent regime in January 1, 2005. The basic provision of TRIPS lies in Article 27.1
which states that all member nations must make patents available for all inventions, whether products
or processes, in all fields of technology. The provision also states that all members must provide full
patent protection to pharmaceuticals (Lee, 2008). India brought its laws into compliance via three
amendments:
1. The first amendment was passed in 1995 in which the Indian government implemented
the "mailbox" rule. This rule provided a system for filing patent applications. Although
these applications would only be examined after India started granting product patents.
2. The second amendment, passed in 2002, lengthened the patent term to 20 years and
also modified the compulsory licensing requirements and the burdens of proof for
patent infringement.
3. The third and final amendment was passed in 2005, when the Indian patent office
started granting product patents.
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Because the TRIPS agreement was signed in 1994, the market had knowledge of the impending
changes since then. As a result, starting as early as 1995, firms were able to change their internal
strategies to take advantage of this impending shift in policy. Moreover, because drug discovery
timelines often span more than ten years, firms would have had to react to such policy changes early
enough in order to enjoy benefits by 2005. Therefore, we took 1995 as the date when the market
started reacting to the new patent laws despite the uncertainty in implementation.
In 2005, a provision 3(d) was added with the final amendment that raised some controversy.
This provision in Section 3(d) of the amendment states certain conditions which do not count as
patentable inventions. For example, incremental improvements to existing therapies which do not
afford significant improvement in efficacy may not count as a patentable invention. The purpose of this
provision was to prevent frivolous patents that are only trivial modifications of existing inventions.
A case in point has been the patent rejection of Novartis's Gleevec, a drug for the treatment of
chronic myeloid leukemia (CML). In 1993, Novartis filed worldwide patents for the active molecule of
the drug, imatinib, however it did not file in India because at the time the 1970 patent law of India did
not allow patenting of product patents. In 1995, Novartis filed a "mailbox" patent in India for the salt
form of the drug which was 30% more efficacious than the active molecule in the original 1993 patent
application. However, when the patent application was reviewed by the Indian patent in 2006, it was
rejected on the grounds that the 1995 Indian application lacked originality and inventiveness compared
to the original 1993 patent and because it did not meet the "enhanced" efficacy requirement of
Provision 3(d). Novartis appealed on the grounds that Section 3(d) was not compliant with TRIPS and
that it was vague and ambiguous and thus discriminatory against Novartis. The case is currently in
review by a special tribunal of the Indian judicial system called the Intellectual Property Appellate Board
(IPAB). India's patent laws need to be clear and reliable in order to effectively advance innovation. The
result of such cases will determine how companies view the IP-related policy changes (Lee, 2008).
Table 2: Summary of patent Law history in India
- British Patent and Design Act, 1911
- Product and process patent regime.
- Life of drug patent: 14 yrs
- Patents Act, 1972
- Patent only method or process
- Life of patent: 5-7 years
- Only one method / process patentable
- Signing of the WTO TRIPS Treaty, 1995
* Patent Amendment Bill allowed filing and handling of product patent applications
- Product Patent regime in place, 2005
- Firms granted product patents in India
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Pharmaceutical Industry In India
As mentioned above, India is known worldwide as a prominent manufacturer of generic drugs.
It supplies 22 percent of the world's output of generic drugs (Ch5 NAID, pg. 118). In 2005-06, India
exported drugs, pharmaceuticals and chemicals worth $58 to a large number of countries including the
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and China (Ch 5, NAID, pg 119). India has the largest
number of FDA-approved manufacturing facilities besides the United States.
Both India and China are emerging economies that have recently come in line with the global
patent laws. As a result, they are good models to assess whether or not harmonization of patent laws
has been good for the host country in terms of fostering greater innovation.
Figure 2: Timeline of product patents in China and India
China
Effectively no patent laws Product patents
1992
India
Product Process Transition Product
patents patents period patents
1970 1995 2005
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Chapter 4 EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND METHODS
We chose to use patents as a proxy for measuring innovative activity of a nation. Unlike other
forms of innovations such as trade secrets, journal articles, inventions that are not formally recorded
etc., patents are quantifiable. Therefore by using patents it is possible to understand patterns and
trends over time.
Ideally we would like to look at patents filed in the respective country. However, that data is
not readily available. China has a patent website, however the patent filings are not broken down by
industry type. The data from India's patent website is also limited. Therefore, we chose to look at
patent filings in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The United States continues to
be a leader in the market and therefore it is safe to assume that any innovation that has economic value
will be filed with the USPTO. Moreover, the USPTO has been collecting patents data for over 100 years
and has the data available in digital format since 1976, providing a solid length of time to do trend
analysis. The patent data is also rich in information that enables us to dig deep and learn more about
types of innovations, countries that they originate from etc.
We limited our study to the life sciences industry because of the particular importance of
intellectual property to this industry. The life sciences industry is unique in that it takes a lot more
investment to discover a drug than to produce it. Therefore it is very important for a company that
discovers a therapy to be ensured market exclusivity so that it can recoup its investment. Limiting our
search to the life sciences industry also helps eliminate any inter-industry variations allowing us to do a
more in-depth analysis.
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg in their NBER working paper series 8498, "The NBER patent Citations
Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools" have developed a very useful classification system
that allows one to bucket patent data into broad categories of industries such as Chemicals, Computers
and Communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronic, Mechanical and Others. They use
the classification codes of the USPTO to assign each patent into one of these categories. By using the
classification codes for 'Drugs and Medical' we were able to limit our search to the life sciences industry.
We started by looking at the overall level of patent activity from each country. Using the
advanced query feature of the USPTO website, we ran a search on all patents that had China or India as
the assignee country or inventor country. The query was run on January 5, 2010 and includes all patents
issued from 1976 through 2009.
Patent data was uploaded from the USPTO website as part of earlier works by Fensterheim
(Fensterheim, 2009) and loaded onto an Ms SQL Server database. The dataset extends from January 29,
1974 till January 27, 2009 (38 years). It includes all patents granted during that period totaling
3,903,153 patents. Life sciences related patents coming from China and India were then filtered on the
basis of the following criteria:
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* Assignee Country or Inventor Country: The Assignee Country contains the country name of the
patent assignee at the time of the patent issue. The Inventor Country contains the country of
residence of the inventor at the time of the patent issue. We filtered for either of the two fields
to be India (IN) or China (CN).
* Classification codes: All patents are designated a code and subcode called the 'class' and
'subclass' according to the US Patent Classification system. This system is maintained by the
Office of Patent Classification of the USPTO and is updated regularly to account for newly
created and obsolete technologies and industries. The classification codes relating to 'Drugs and
Medical' as outlined in the NBER working paper series by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg were used.
These included the following:
* Drugs: '424', '514':
* Surgery and Medical Instruments: '128', '600', '601', '602', '604', '606', '607'
* Biotechnology: '435', '800'
" Miscellaneous-Drugs and Medical: '351', '433', '623'
Based on the above mentioned criteria, a datafile of patents originating from India and China
was created.
Dating of Patents and the Truncation problem:
Each patent includes the date of when the inventor filed for the patent (application date) and
the date when the patent was granted (grant date or issue date). The application date is the closest
date to when the patent was 'invented' and therefore the date of choice for our analysis. However, as
one gets closer to the last date of the dataset, the data filtered on application date suffers from missing
observations -patents that are applied for but not yet granted do not appear. On average it takes about
three years for a patent to be granted although there is large variability. This truncation problem should
be kept in mind when analyzing data segmented by application date.
We first used the datafile to look at the number of patents that were filed each year from China
and India. As mentioned previously, we used 1992 as the year product patents started being recognized
in China and 1995 as the year they started being recognized in India. We looked at the change in the
number of patents per year post patent law changes to evaluate the trend in China and India.
We also used the sub classification codes to understand the distribution of patents within Drugs,
Medical Devices (Surgery and Medical Instruments), and Biotechnology.
Finally, we wanted to learn about the type of companies that are filing patents -whether they
are MNCs, domestic corporations or government-run public institutions. We first used the 'Assignee
Type' field from the data file. This field designates whether the patents are from the United States or
foreign and whether they are corporation, individual or government owned. We filtered our data for
the following three fields: Foreign (3), Foreign Individual (5), Foreign Government (7) or unknown (-1).
We found that using the assignee type field from the database was not useful as many assignees were
clearly government institutions, but were assigned the code of foreign corporation. Therefore, we
conducted our own search to bucket each assignee as either 'public institutions, 'local private' or
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'foreign private'. Public institutions include government run universities and hospitals and non-profit
institutions. 'Local private' are indigenous companies and 'foreign private' are multinationals. There
were also some patents that were assigned to individuals and some that were from foreign public
institutions. However their numbers were insignificantly small and therefore these were left out.
We dug deeper to see how many new companies were filing for patents each year. For each
application year, we looked at all the assignee names and counted the patent only if the company or
institution had never before filed for patents. This analysis we hoped would give us insight into whether
stronger patent laws has spurred innovative activities by newer entities rather than companies with
established R&D investments.
Finally, we looked at all the patents in FDA's current Orange Book and evaluated how many, if
any, were from China and India. FDA's Orange Book contains a listing of all patents relating to approved
drug products that are currently under patent protection. We hoped that this brief analysis would give
us insight into whether the type of patents being filed from China and India have truly been innovative
and led to therapeutic benefits.
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Chapter 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The overall goal of this research is to understand the changes in innovative activity in China and
India after strengthening of intellectual property laws in each country. To get an initial snapshot we
looked at the total number of patents from China and India (table 3). Overall, China has 2.4 times more
patents compared to India, but when we limit the search to the classification codes of 'Drugs and
Medical', India comes out as having 1.4 times more patents than China. Overall, 'Drugs and Medical'
form 6% of all Chinese patents and 20% of all Indian patents. Clearly, as an industry, it is much more
prominent in India than in China.
Table3: Overview of Indian and Chinese Patents
China India
No. of all patents: 15,537 6,562
No. of patents
by classification codes for Drugs and Medical 977 1,322
Drugs and Medical as a percentage: 6.29% 20.15%
Source: USPTO, Jan 5, 2010
We then took the universe of "Drugs and Medical" patents and segmented them based on
application date (figure 3). Due to the truncation problem mentioned in the previous chapter, the
number of patents is seen to decline from 2002 in China and 2003 in India. However, we can assume
that in reality this number will keep rising as more and more patents from these years are issued.
Nevertheless, the data is informative. In the early years from 1976 till the mid-eighties the number of
patents from both countries was virtually nil. We see minor amounts of activity from the mid-eighties
till the mid-nineties and after that there is an exponential rise in the number of patents. This rise
corresponds to the creation and implementation of product patent laws.
Figure 3: Number of life science related patents by country (by application year)
Number of Patents by Application Year
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The sheer number of patents is greater in India compared to China. This is likely due to the
already established generics industry in India as a result of the patent law of 1970 which established
technical know-how in the country and enabled the indigenous firms to use the stronger IP laws to their
advantage. In his book, 'The Development Dilemma', Ostergard says that developing countries can only
benefit from stronger IP laws if they have an established knowledge industry in order to conduct
research activity leading to innovations/inventions.
We dug a little deeper and evaluated the magnitude of increase in the number of patents from
each country. Figures 4 and 5 show the number of patents per application year from China and India. A
trendline was drawn for each country from the product patent start year (1992 for China and 1995 for
India) till the year of maximum patents (2002 for China and 2003 for India). We evaluated the increase
only till the year with maximum number of patents because we assumed that the decrease in patents
was caused by the truncation problem and the number of patents in reality will keep increasing beyond
those years and not dip down to zero as exhibited in the graphs. Both China and India show an upward
spike following stronger patent laws. But, India has a significantly higher increase compared to China
(23.2 vs. 8.0). The much steeper rise in the number of Indian patents can be explained by India's
established capabilities as a generic manufacturer. The generics process enabled India to invest in
research for reverse engineering existing drugs and thus gave it a head-start into innovative drug
research. The Chinese life sciences sector on the other hand was more focused on manufacturing rather
than reverse-engineering existing drugs and therefore did not develop such research capabilities.
Figure 4: Magnitude of increase in the number of life science related patents from China after creation
of stronger patent laws.
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Figure 5: Magnitude of increase in the number of life science related patents from India after creation of
stronger patent laws.
Number of Patents from India by Application Year
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Having established that the number of drug applications from both China and India are on the
rise since the strengthening of patent laws, we wanted to get additional insights into which sub-industry
and which kinds of firms are responsible for the increase.
Figures 6 and 7 show the original data file segmented by classification codes. Classification
codes as outlined by Hall et. al. allow segmentation of life-science patents between pharmaceuticals
(drugs), biotechnology and medical devices (surgery and instrumentation). The data show that the rise
in the number of patent applications in both China and India seem to correspond primarily to Drugs and
Biotech. In addition, China shows some activity in the 'Surgery and Medical Instruments' category
whereas India has virtually no patents in medical devices. This further corresponds to our hypothesis
that India's steeper increase is due to its established capabilities in generics manufacturing as medical
devices are not subjected to generics competition. As a result, India does not inherently possess any
capabilities in medical device innovation.
Gupta, 2010 
Page 23
e - =:= ... . ...... ...  ........ ..
t , Page 23
Figure 6: Number of life-science related patents segmented by industry-type (China)
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Figure 7: Number of life-science related patents segmented by industry-type (India)
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Next, we wanted to understand which types of firms were responsible for the increase in both
countries. We used the "Assignee Type" field in the database to separate firms that were designated as
'foreign'. The number of patents by application date from China and India with Assignee Types of
'Foreign' and either inventor country or assignee country as China or India is shown in Figure 8 below.
These patents are more representative of indigenous firms or institutions from China and India and are
therefore a better reflection of innovative activities in the host countries. The data in previous figures
(4-6) includes US-based MNCs that have collaborations with firms in China or India or have set-up their
own subsidiaries there. It must be kept in mind however that 'foreign' also applies to 'non-US' firms and
therefore figure 8 also includes those MNCs that are not based in US such as European based MNCs.
Nevertheless, figure 8 show a trend similar to figures 4-6. The number of patent filings is seen to
explode from the mid-nineties onwards in both countries.
Figure 8: Number of life science related patents by country with Foreign Assignee Type, sorted by
application date.
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We then divided the patentees (or assignees) into three categories: Public Institutions, Local
Private Firms and Foreign Private firms (see Methods section). Table 4 below is a summary of the
overall distribution of patents by assignee type pre and post transition to product patents.
Table 4: Overall distribution of patents amongst Public institutions, Local private firms and foreign MNCs.
Overall Pre-transition Post-transition
China India China India China India
Public 206 (37%) 514 (47%) 21 (57%) 29 (23%) 185 (36%) 485 (51%)
Institutions I I
Local Private 170(30%) 405 (37%) 3 (8%) 25 (20%) 167 (32%) 380(40%)
Foreign Private 182 (33%) 166 (15%) 13 (35%) 74(58%) 169 (32%) 92 (10%)
Before product patents were introduced (pre-transition), public institutions had the highest
percentage of patent applications in China (57%) whereas foreign private MNCs had the highest share
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(58%) in India. This makes sense given the patent laws in each country in that era. India had strong
patent laws and therefore attracted foreign multinationals who established their facilities to carry out
drug research at low costs and sell drugs at high prices. On the other hand, China did not have a strong
patent system and hence multinationals stayed away from that market. In this pre-transition period, the
actual number of patents from public institutions is approximately the same between China and India.
Post-transition, public institutions have the highest proportion of patents in both countries. Also,
in the post-transition period China has an equal number of patent applications from local and foreign
firms whereas India has a significantly higher applicant pool from local than foreign private firms. The
difference in the sheer number of patents in both countries pre and post transition is also significant.
This much higher activity form local private firms in India is interesting. Even though both countries
have strong patent laws, it seems that the local firms in China have not been able to capitalize on the
opportunity of innovation led drug research as much as Indian firms. The most likely reason for this as
mentioned before is because India already had established research capabilities due to its 1970 patent
law that promoted local industries to copying existing drugs . Another explanation can be found in the
type of R&D policies followed by each country. China requires that in order for MNCs to invest in the
country, they need to conduct some R&D functions in China, as a return for market access (Parayil G.,
D'Costa A.P., 2008). In addition, the Chinese government offers tax incentives for MNCs to open up R&D
facilities. This creates an additional incentive for multinationals to establish their research presence in
exchange for low cost and market access. Whereas in India, the dominance of a local industry and lack
of government incentives reduces the activity of foreign MNCs.
To understand this activity better, we segmented the above data by application year (Figures 9
& 10). The data confirms the significant role of public institutions in new patent generation in both
countries. Table 5 below lists the most prominent institutions from each country filing patent
applications. In India, the Center for Scientific and Industrial Research stands out as the largest IP filer.
In China, there is no one institution that is dominant over the others.
Figures 9 and 10 also show that while government is the biggest IP producer, local private
industry has just started to become inventive in both countries recently (1990s). So even though China
is not as developed in its patenting capabilities as India, nevertheless, its industry is moving in the right
direction. In fact, in figure 9 we can see that the activity from local firms surpasses foreign firms starting
at year 2000. Therefore, we can conclude that strengthening of patent laws has led to innovative
activities in both countries regardless of their developmental level before the laws changed. From table
5, we can see that in India there are a few firms that are doing a lot of the inventive work (notably, Dr.
Reddy's Laboratories, Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, and Biocon), whereas in China there are a lot many
players with smaller contributions. This further confirms the fragmented nature of the Chinese life
sciences sector.
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Figure 9: Number of patents from China separated by assignee type
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Figure 10: Number of patents from India separated by assignee type
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Table 5: The top 5 patent assignees in each country by category
Pre-Transition
IName
Public Institutions
1 Center for Scientific and Industrial Research
2 National Institute of Immunology
3 All India Institute of Medical Sciences
Sree Chitra Tirunal Inst. for Medical Science &
4 Technology
5 Sarabhai Research Centre
Foreign Pnvate
1 Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft
2 Ciba-Geigy Corporation
3 Rohm and Haas Company
4 Aktiebolaget Astra
5 Conopco
Local Private
1 Cadlia Laboratories Limited
2 Godrej Soaps Limited
3 Vittal Mallya Scientific Research Foundation
4 Zeneca Limited
Public Institutions
1 China National Seed Corporation
2 Tsinghua University
3 Beijing Information Technology Institute
Biomedical Engineering Development Center of Sun
4 Yat-Sen University ofMedical Science
5 many more at 1
Foreign Private
1 TaIshi Foods Company Ltd.
2 Bayer Aktiengesellschaft
3 many more at 1...
4
5
Local Private
1 Wide Trade Foundation Ltd. & Export Corporation
2 none
3
4
5
patents Name
Post-transition
patents
Center for Scientific and Industrial Research
National Insitute of Immunology
Univ of Delhi
Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics /
National Research Development Corporation /
Department of Biotechnology
CV Therapeutics, Inc.
Natreon
AstraZeneca AB
Sabinsa Corp
Uposome Company
Dr. Reddy's Laboratories
Ranbaxy
Dabur Research Foundation
Panacea Biotech
Blocon
377
10
4
3
1g
9
7
7
7
5g
37
24
18
15
2 Chinese Academy of Sciences 12
1 Univ of Hong Kong 12
1 Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences 10
1 The Chinese University of Hong Kong 9
Third Military Medical University Chinese People's
1 Liberation Army 6
Bayer Corporation
The Procter & Gamble Company
Aviva Biosciences
Schering Corporation
Hoffman-La Roche Inc.
Shanghai Blo Road Gene Development, Ltd.
Sun Hing Optical Manufactory Limited
Jiangsu Kanion Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Wex Medical Instrumentation Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Zhongpd Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
Nanning Maple Leaf Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Shanghal Jiao D Onity Co., Ltd.
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Finally, we looked at the number of new entities filing for patents. For each application year, we
only counted the entity if it had never owned a patent in previous years (figure 11). Again the data
shows that both China and India have seen an exponential increase in the number of new entities filing
for patents after the mid-nineties, corresponding to the creation and implementation of stronger patent
laws. China shows a higher increase compared with India, however the difference is not significant.
When separating these new entities by category, we see that India has a lot more local private firms
filing patents compared with China (figures 12 and 13). In China, the increase in patent filing between
public institutions, foreign multinationals and local private firms is almost equal. However, the Indian
life sciences sector shows a significantly higher activity in patent filing from the local private firms
compared to public institutions and foreign multinationals. This clearly reflects that developed nature of
the domestic industry in India.
Figure 11: Number of new entities with patents per application year
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Figure 12: Number of new entities filing patents, separated by category in China
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Figure 13: Number of new entities filing patents, separated by category, in India
35 Number of new entities filing patents, separated by category in India
on 30
c 25
20
15
d 10
25
0-
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Application Year
- Public Institutions - Foreign Private - Local Private
At the end, this patent activity is only meaningful if it leads to innovative therapies. Because we
have focused our research on patents filed in the United States, it made sense to see if any of these
patents had led to approved therapies in the US. FDA's Orange Book contains a listing of all patents
relating to approved drug products that are currently under patent protection. There are a total of
6,540 patents listed. We looked into how many, if any, of these were from China and India. We found
that 5 are from China and 4 from India. Table 6 lists these patents along with the assignee, category and
name. In China, 3 of the 5 patents are from foreign private firms and the remaining 2 are from public
institutions (Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences). In contrast, 3 of the 4 in India are from foreign
private firms and the remaining is from a local private firm (Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals). This difference
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further supports the established research capabilities of the local industry in India compared to China.
Although, both countries have a long way to go before their life sciences industries can be truly
considered innovative.
Table 6: List of patents from China and India in the Orange Book
Patent No. Asiggnee Name ael
5192535 Insite Vision IncorporatedFoegPrvt
5438071 American Cyanamid Company Foreign Private
5677331 Ciba-Geigy AG Foreign Private
Cancer Institute (Hospital), Chinese Academy of
5795911 Medical Sciences Public Institution
Cancer Institute (Hospital), Chinese Academy of
5968973 Medical Sciences Public Institution
Patent No. Asiggnee Name Category
6629968 Vyteris
6890957 Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals
7183264 CV Therapeutics Inc.
7144872 CV Therapeutics Inc.
Foreign Private
Local Private
Foreign Private
Foreign Private
App Year Patent Name
1990 Ophthalmic suspensions
Stable porfimer sodium compositions and methods
1993 for their manufacture
1994 Antimalarial compositions
1997 Composition for treating Condyloma acuminata
1998 Method fortreating hyperplasia
App Year Patent Name
Shelf storage stable iontophoresis reservoir-electrode
and iontophoretic system incorporating the reservoir-
2000 electrode
2003 Liquid formulation of metformin
2003 N-pyrazole A2A receptor agonists
2005 N-pyrazole A2A receptor agonists
So, can we conclude that stronger IP regimes have been beneficial for the host countries of
China and India? Although there is a lot of literature concluding that strong IP laws are more favorable
to the developed world, our research shows that for China and India the story may be different. The
local industry in both countries seems to have reacted positively to the policy shift. The industry in India
is certainly seasoned to take advantage of the strengthened patents laws along with cost advantages
and a rising middle class to take a central role in drug discovery and innovation (Timmons, 2010). China
too shows a trend is the same direction and coupled with the other government policies that encourage
establishment of research and development facilities by multinationals, China will take advantage of the
strong IP laws to translate into innovation led economic growth.
Using patents as a proxy for innovation has its limitations however. Patents only capture a
subset of innovations. By definition, a patent in an invention that is novel, useful and non-obvious.
There can be inventions that do not fit this narrow definition. Some inventions are business process
oriented. Or a company can simply keep trade-secrets. Moreover, filing and maintaining patents is
expensive and virtually all companies (and individuals) pick and choose which inventions to patent.
Therefore, patents are likely a subset of the total universe of all inventions. However, given their
secretive nature it is impossible to attempt to quantify the other inventions. Furthermore, there is also
a difference between invention and innovation. While an invention is the first occurrence of an idea, an
innovation is the first attempt to put it into use by commercializing it. We can assume though that if an
entity makes the effort, in time and money, to patent something, it is most likely to realize its economic
value by attempting to commercialize it. Therefore, patents can be taken as a good proxy of innovation.
Also, all patents are not equal. 'Composition of matter' patents are more innovative than
'method of use' patents. Similarly, product patents are superior to process patents. In my analysis, due
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to a lack of a way of distinguishing the quality of patents, all patents received the same weight. It would
be interesting to evaluate whether the type of patents originating from China and India are simply more
quantities of process patents or whether there is level of novel research activity in those countries that
is leading to disruptive inventions. Finally, there is an issue of law versus enforcement. Although the
Chinese patent laws have all the characteristics of a strong IP protection, enforcement in that country is
reported to be problematic. This weakness in IPR protection has been a major concern for many foreign
companies (Cao, Simon, Suttmeier, 2009). India also poses the same problem. Moreover, there are
subtleties within the patent laws that need to be understood and managed. Such subtle yet important
details will determine the response of patent law on the Indian industry and its economy.
In conclusion, the effects of a country's patent system on its domestic industry and public health
are evident. India built a sizable generics industry as a result of a deliberate move by the Indian
government in establishing a conservative patent law in 1970. Today, China and India are at inroads to
becoming strong economic powerhouses. As a consequence, stronger IP laws may benefit Chinese and
Indian local industries by encouraging path breaking research and development. However, the devil lies
in the detail and the implementation of these policies needs to be managed to ensure success.
(Timmons, 2010)
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSION & NEXT STEPS
Both India and China show an explosion in the number of life-science related patent applications
starting in the mid 1990s. This explosion corresponds to the timing of stronger IP laws in both countries.
Therefore, we can conclude that stronger IP laws have resulted in greater innovation in both countries.
Based on our analysis we can conclude that both India and China have seen an explosion in the
number of patent applications since their patent laws were harmonized with those detailed in the TRIPS
agreement. However, the magnitude of the increase is different and likely due to the development level
and research capabilities of each country as well as due to the subtle differences in policies followed by
each country.
As a next step it would be interesting to see the trend of patent applications filed in China and
India and if this also corresponds to the increase seen in the US patent filings. According to a recent
article, China has witnessed a continuous growth in patent applications. In 2009, The State Intellectual
Property Office of the PRC received a total of 976,686 patent applications
(http://www.chinatrademarkoffice.com/). In 2008, the Indian Intellectual Patent Office (CGPDTM -
Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks) received 35,812 applications
(http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patents.htm).
It would also be worthwhile to go into depth of the types of patents originating from each
country. True innovation should result in new therapies for conditions with unmet medical needs. A
detailed look into the patents will also help answer whether the innovations occurring in China and India
are beneficial to the local people or whether they are simply catering to the richer west.
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